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Restrictions on Trade in
Communication and
Information Services
Geza Feketekuty
Jonathan David Aronson*

INTRODUCTION
A revolution in information exchange is underway. The convergence of
computer and communication technologies, sometimes called "telematics," "compunications," or "teleinformatics," 1 is making it possible for
information in many forms to be transmitted instantly and cheaply between any two points on the globe. The technological means to establish
a universal, international communications network linking all mankind are
within reach. Indeed, many pieces of this network already exist.
The international exchange of data and information through this global
communication network constitutes an increasingly important element of
world trade and a major source of future economic growth. This rising
international flow of data and information is also increasingly a preoccupation of governments concerned about privacy, national security, cultural
independence and domestic industrial development. 2 The challenge that
faces national policymakers is to maximize the benefits derived from the
free exchange of information while at the same time guaranteeing the
national security and the social and cultural integrity of their countries.
Finding the proper balance between openness and regulation is difficult
but crucial.
Because restrictions on trade in communication and information services distort trade, impair growth, and hamper innovation, we believe that,
* Geza Feketekuty is the Senior Assistant U.S. Trade Representative; Jonathan David
Aronson is an Associate Professor at the School of International Relations at the University
of Southern California and a Council on Foreign Relations, International Affairs Fellow at
USTR in 1982-1983. Views expressed in this article are personal and are not intended to
represent policy of the United States Government. We wish to thank Nancy Adams, Arthur
Bushkin, Peter Cowhey, Oswald Ganley, and Joan Spero for their comments.
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as a general rule, countries should try to promote free trade in telecommunications, data processing, and information services to the greatest extent possible. Our aim in this article is to outline an approach that could
help minimize protectionist barriers that threaten the free flow of information across national borders. To do so, we suggest ways to distinguish
between protectionist and "legitimate" reasons for imposing policy measures that may impede trade in communication and information services.
Our argument unfolds in three parts. Section one highlights some of the
changes that the revolution in information exchange is producing. It also
argues that transborder data flows could help facilitate international economic adjustment. Section two analyzes the types of reasons used to
justify policy measures that inhibit the integration of the world communication network or prevent information from flowing across national borders. It also discusses the implication of restrictions on transborder data
flows for the world trading system and for world economic growth. The
final section discusses strategies for halting the proliferation of barriers to
trade in communication and information services and for reducing existing
obstacles.

THE NEW INFORMATION ECONOMY
Before telegraph and telephones, information had to be manually transferred from one place to another. Diplomacy and commerce were transformed by the capability to transmit information over wires. The
introduction of radio and television accelerated the pace of change still
further. In the past forty years, communication possibilities have multiplied as modem technology has brought down the cost and increased the
speed and reliability of communications and as computers revolutionized
storage, processing and retrieval of data. Computing and communication
costs have fallen dramatically as computational power and ease of communications have increased. New breakthroughs continue to transform the
communication network and speed the exchange of information worldwide.3 Some examples follow:
(1) In print journalism, articles can be written in one country, edited and
mocked up in a second, typeset by computers in a third, and then transmitted by satellite for printing halfway around the world. 4 Ultimately, it may
be unnecessary for publishers to print books, magazines, or newspapers.
Updated information could be entered into data banks with access gained
instantly from home or office terminals.
(2) As for education, lessons can be transmitted, live or taped, by shortwave or television, to rural areas lacking qualified teachers. Even the need
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to gather for classes might in many cases be eliminated when students can
"tune in" to prerecorded classes.
(3) The existing global data processing network also permits engineers
in Pakistan to produce architectural drawings, Indian computer programmers to write computer software, and coders and keypunch operators
working in Barbados all to transmit their work to companies in North
America almost instantaneously.
(4) Consumer data bases have markedly changed commerce and tourism. In 1959 Bankamericard (now Visa), the first universal system for
providing consumer credit, was introduced in California. Today, American
Express, Visa, Master Charge, and other charge cards are accepted as means
of payment for goods and services throughout the world. We will soon be
able to verify the availability of funds and transfer them between the
accounts of buyers and sellers wherever the funds may be held. 5
(6) Finally, innovations in banking, such as the introduction of Electronic Funds Transfer Systems (EFTS), and the creation in 1973 of the Society
of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) have
speeded the transfer and reduced the cost of moving information and
funds between domestic branches and across national borders. Both of
these systems have transformed the business operations of banking and
other financial institutions. International banking on its present scale could
not exist without them. 6
Developments such as these will speed economic growth, create new
jobs, spread education, and make more information available to more
people. But the new technologies also appear threatening to many. 7
Change in itself tends to be upsetting. Beyond that, governments fear the
loss of national control. As technical barriers to the international movement of information fall, all countries become more interdependent and
some national control is lost. Governments are trying to grapple with the
problem of managing the new abundance of information. They want to
adapt, but not too quickly. To slow the process of change and adaption,
some countries are imposing new regulations to control information flows.
Most government officials also recognize that telematics and high technology-based industries will be important to future economic vitality.
Many industrial countries, France and Japan being prominent examples,
are trying to promote their future prospects by subsidizing and in some
cases protecting industries of the future. Several advanced developing
countries, such as Brazil, hope to insure that they do not fall too far behind
in developing these new industries. Both types of countries are thus tempted to try to stimulate and protect the development of their own domestic
information industries. 8
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REGULATION OF TRADE IN INFORMATION
AND COMMUNICATION SERVICES
One way in which governments attempt to control the rate and kind of
change is by limiting electronic access to computer data banks abroad or
by limiting the extent to which foreigners can use communication channels
for providing information or communication services. Actions of these two
types slow change and hamper economic growth. Assessing the costs and
benefits is the job of politicians, but, to make such decisions sensibly,
politicians must balance the need to protect political, social, and cultural
values against economic benefits.
It is useful first to describe the main types of obstacles to transborder
data flows and the reasons articulated for imposing them before judging
the economic and trade implications of these actions.
Types of Regulations
Regulation of International Data Flows

Many countries have adopted policy measures that either prohibit the
inflow or outflow of certain kinds of information or effectively raise the
cost of transmitting information across national borders to such a high
level that the flow is reduced. Regulations or taxes can limit the transmission of data across borders, either by purposeful design or as an unintended
result. By raising the cost of doing business or by increasing the uncertainty associated with doing business, transmission of information across existing communication lines will be curtailed. For example, the French have
suggested that they might tax the value of data that is imported into
France. This would require expensive modifications of encoded data which
would make the price for foreign enterprises doing business with France
prohibitive. 9 Similarly, several European Postal, Telegraph, and Telephone
(PTT) monopolies have, from time to time, suggested that they might
charge for the use of private leased lines on a volume-sensitive basis
instead of at a fiat rate. 10 Users calculate that this could increase the cost
of transmitting data by as much as 700 percent, making many current
operations uneconomical to maintain. 11
Competition with Communication Monopolies

Friction often develops between government authorities choosing to operate through government owned or controlled PTTs and foreign providers
of data services or value-added communication services. Governments
sometimes choose to limit the number of foreign suppliers of information
services as well as the scope of services that may be provided. 12 For
example, many countries restrict or ban the shared use and resale of private
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line for fear that foreign companies would divert business from the government PTT. 13 Such measures may increase the cost and reduce the
flexibility of international telecommunications operations and significantly hamper trade in goods and services.
A parallel concern, particularly for the United States, is that foreign
PTTs might use their monopoly power to take anticompetitive steps to the
detriment of foreign providers of value-added telecommunication services
and information services not covered by the PTTs' existing monopoly.
Already, the Nordic and Benelux telecommunication authorities have suggested limiting the number of providers of certain new international communication services. 14 United States providers of these services are
concerned that they could be "whipsawed" by foreign PTTs, which might
play foreign suppliers off against each other, thereby shifting the economic
benefits in their favor. There is also concern that foreign PTTs might secure
operating privileges in the United States for their subsidiaries and then
exclude all American competitors from competing for the business of
transmitting information between the United States and their home coun-

tries. 15
DiscriminatoryStandards
A number of governments have established standards for telecommunication-related services that depend on public communication facilities. The
establishment of standards can be extremely useful in encouraging the
growth of new types of information and a value-added communication
services. Standards can also be designed to impose an indirect barrier to
foreign companies, or, alternatively, they may be administered in what
appear to be purposefully discriminatory ways. For instance, several countries have established protocols which cover the bit sequence of the introductory portion of digital messages. 16 In some cases the choice of
sequences required has greatly impaired the efficiency of foreign as compared to local equipment.
Many governments regulate the extent to which privately-owned
equipment can be connected to the public telecommunications network.
Such regulations can severely limit the type, make, or design of equipment
acceptable for "interfacing" with the domestic communications system. 17
This in turn limits the types of communication and data services that can
be provided on a cost-effective basis to users. Restrictive policies with
respect to the type of equipment which can be plugged into the public
communication network, restrict transborder data flows and distort the
logical development of efficient telecommunication networks. Combatting
this trend, several international and regional organizations are currently
engaged in activities that have as their goal the harmonization of telecommunication equipment standards. 18
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Restrictions on the Use of Foreign Data Processing Facilities
A number of countries have adopted or are considering legislation that
would restrict the use of computer facilities located in other countries,
either for data processing or for information retrieval. 19 International
economies of scale and technical considerations are such that when foreign
concerns must duplicate their equipment and data processing facilities in
each processing center, many of the benefits that telematics breakthroughs
have provided are lost, and costs to users rise significantly. At the extreme,
of course, governments could require that publicly-available data services
must be provided domestically. Foreign competition then would effectively be shut out.
In reviewing the types of measures that can restrict the flow of information across national boundaries or prevent the integration of communication systems, it should be emphasized that all of these regulations can, at
least theoretically, be justified on many grounds. One critical challenge for
international policymakers is to develop procedures for distinguishing
regulations meant to hamper trade from measures designed for legitimate
purposes which have an unavoidable effect on trade. This task will become
somewhat easier if countries are convinced that, from the perspective of
growth and economic efficiency, everyone benefits from the free flow of
information and communication services. 20 First, however, we need to
examine the explanations countries give for regulating the international
flow of information.
Reasons for Imposing Regulations on Information Flows
Six sometimes overlapping reasons for regulating the use of the international communication network and transborder data flows are frequently
articulated.
Data Protection and Privacy
Most countries have adopted data protection laws to safeguard the privacy
of their citizens. 21 Some countries go even further and insist on their right
and duty to protect the privacy of their legal citizens such as corporations
and associations. 22 During the 1970s, data protection to ensure privacy
was the most frequent reason given for regulations affecting transborder
information flows. 23 The enactment of such regulations created considerable concern that they might be used by some governments to restrict
transborder data flows.
The rapid expansion of computer capacity to store and manipulate
extensive data files on individuals has provoked concerns about the potential for extensive intrusion into personal privacy. Governments, particular-
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ly in Europe, have reacted by instituting laws designed to protect personal
privacy and to ensure that privacy protection is not diminished by the
export of the information. The new OECD privacy guidelines and the
Council of Europe Treaty are attempts to harmonize differing national
approaches to this issue. 24
Actions to Ensure Cultural and Societal Integrity
A number of countries including France, Canada, and a host of Lesser
Developed Countries (LDCs) have also expressed concern about the dilution of indigenous culture caused by the dissemination of foreign books,
magazines, films, and other materials as well as through the delivery of
television programs via satellite. Governments have adopted a wide variety
of policies to reduce foreign cultural penetration, by limiting the access of
foreign advertising, broadcasting, and publications to their markets. In
recent years advances in modern video and information retrieval techniques have extended considerably the possibility for delivering information to people. These advances, in turn, have prompted many governments
to extend their regulation of information flows to the newest technologies.
The seemingly pervasive concern that the spread of foreign data processing may subject potentially large sectors of societies to excessive influence from dominant, alien cultures tacitly underlies these regulations. This
argument has been raised repeatedly by developing countries in the councils of UNESCO and also by the Canadians and other industrialized countries with reference to the United States.
Actions to Safeguard National Security and Sovereignty
Most governments, including the United States, maintain measures to
prevent public disclosure of information related to national security. In
general, such laws seek to prevent public disclosure of vital information
and do not seek specifically to prevent its international transfer. In some
cases, however, the result is that the outward flow of technical data is
restricted.
Some governments also argue that consideration of their economic
security requires them to restrict the international transfer of information
about their domestic economic resources. For example, Brazil and other
developing countries have opposed the use of remote sensing systems or
other advanced detection techniques which might provide foreign countries or companies with oil production data or with better information on
potential deposits and distribution than is available to local authorities. 25
Some governments also restrict the international transfer of certain
types of economic information in order to protect the sovereignty of economic activity of their citizens. By denying foreign entities such information, governments in general try to make it more difficult for other
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governments to assert extraterritorial regulatory authority over them or
over those operating within their borders.
Laws to Ensure Access to Data Vital to the Public Interest
Many countries require that information necessary to the functioning of
their economies be stored or processed domestically. Government officials
fear that for economic, political, or technological reasons they might be cut
off from critical data or they could be vulnerable to the threat of such a
cut off. Two examples of such measures are frequently cited. First, in
banking, Canada and Germany, for different reasons, require data about
the accounts of their nationals to be stored and processed domestically. 26
Such measures, however, force foreign banks to duplicate at substantial
cost their record processing hardware and software in each country. The
second example is that of the Malmo, Sweden fire department-computer
program. Malmo computerized the plan of the city to help the fire department act efficiently during emergencies. The information was stored in a
computer in Cleveland, Ohio and accessed by satellite. Great concern
arose, however, when an electrical failure in Cleveland and a fire in Malmo
occurred simultaneously, preventing Malmo from tapping its data. The
27
data file was subsequently transferred to Amsterdam.
Protection of User and Consumer Interests Through Public Monopolies
Many governments regulate the access of foreign telecommunications entities to their market to ensure the provision of reasonably priced, reliable
service to their private citizens and corporate users. The United States is
nearly unique in its reliance on market forces to provide not only information services but also, to an increasing degree, a wide variety of telecommunication services: e.g., long-distance calls or data links. Elsewhere, the
full range of telecommunication services are provided exclusively by government owned, or controlled telecommunication monopolies (PITs) empowered to establish fair prices and to provide reliable services. Often, this
mandate requires regulators to distinguish clearly between the regulation
of domestic and international services. Previously, the variety of telecommunication links between countries was more limited, with the result that
the distinctions between domestic and international regulation of services
were less significant. With the merger of computer and communication
technologies, however, disparities between domestic and international
regulatory structure have affected transborder data flows.
Rapid advances in technology, and the corresponding decline in the
capital investment required to establish new communication services, have
improved the prospects of smaller firms more efficiently providing specialized, international telecommunication services. Some governments fear
that if too many providers of new services gain access to their markets, it
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will be more difficult for them to protect the public interest or to protect
the economic position of their public telecommunication monopolies. For
example, a number of countries are concerned that the international application of the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) deregulatory
efforts under the so-called Computer II Inquiry will subject them to
America's free market competition and undermine their planned communication market. Some of these countries see this FCC action as threatening the domestic authority of their own PTTs. They have stated that
they may retaliate to prevent the deterioration of government control of
their national telematic services. 28 By contrast, Britain, Japan, and Australia have reduced regulation and they are experimenting with greater
market competition in an effort to lower costs to users while still providing
29
reliable services.
ProtectionistActions to Shield Domestic Industries
Countries also erect barriers to transborder data flows and resist integration
with some parts of the telecommunication network to protect domestic
industries from foreign competition. Classic arguments for infant industry
protection are raised to justify restrictions on telecommunications, data
processing, and information services. Countries argue that they must protect and promote industries which will be central to their future economic
prosperity. Often domestic manufacturers of communication and computer equipment, for example, are protected from foreign competition. Brazil
and some industrial countries attempt to protect their industries by placing
barriers on imports of telecommunication and information equipment and
services. 3
Most industrial countries have largely agreed to limit the establishment
of new tariff barriers. 31 However, most of these countries maintain nontariff barriers on the exchange of goods and services, thereby distorting
world trade flows. 32 Ultimately, such barriers may be more damaging to
world trade than explicit impact barriers at the border because when the
transportation, communication, and financial underpinnings of trade are
damaged, all trade, not just the activity of specific sectors, is disrupted. 33
In some cases, the protectionist motive for regulation of trade in communication and information services is explicit; in other cases, governments claim that their actions fulfill one or more of the other
non-economic goals described earlier. One responsibility of trade policy
officials is to find ways to distinguish measures that serve purely protectionist purposes that distort world trade from those that advance legitimate
social or security goals, so that efforts can be made to limit the enactment
of new obstacles and to remove those currently in force.
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Possible Effects of Regulation on Information Flows
Having reviewed the most common types of regulations and the reasons
normally given for imposing them, we can now analyze the likely impact
of these measures on transborder data flows and on the functioning of the
international communications network.
It is prudent to note, however, that despite the increased attention
devoted to restrictions on information and communication flows, the establishment of such barriers has not already become a critical situation. 34
Indeed, as policy officials we are trying to promote adjustment to the new
communication and information technologies and strengthen the bases for
free trade in value-added communication and information services to prevent a crisis from arising. To date, companies have managed to continue
their operations with only minimal dislocation of their preferred communication and data-processing activities. New market opportunities have
been somewhat curtailed, though they probably have not been severely
restricted. Unless some sound steps are taken soon, however, at least four
types of negative economic consequences could result.
Disruption of Existing Economic Activities

The most fundamental impact of the continued proliferation of barriers to
trade in communication and information services would be the disruption
of existing international commercial and financial relations. The breakdown of the charge card network or of the SWIFT system used by the
banks would, for example, seriously affect the day-to-day functioning of
world commerce. 35 Similarly, the logistics of the world's air and marine
transportation systems would be threatened by major communication disruptions or breakdowns.
Impact on Growth of Domestic Economies

Specific cases suggest that government regulation of information flows has
forced many firms to make suboptimal decisions, particularly from a cost
standpoint, regarding information, data processing, and telecommunication services. 36 For example, some firms have been forced to develop
separate facilities in different countries, thereby increasing their costs,
reducing their efficiency, and perhaps diverting their investments from
more productive uses. Moreover, restrictions on communication and information services may influence the operations and planning of other industries which use them in providing their services or producing their
products.
Business concerns about future actions by governments have probably
had a more adverse economic impact than the actual measures taken by
governments to date. Concern about future restrictions, enhanced by in-
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tense debate in government circles, has induced some enterprises to postpone investments in data processing and telecommunication systems and
facilities to the detriment of international trade and economic growth in
general. These reactions to anticipated restrictions have had a real, although difficult to measure, impact on the domestic as well as the international structure of industry. Inefficiency which need not have occurred has
37
crept into the system because of political and protectionist concerns.
Impact on Growth of the World Economy

Growth of the world economy depends on trade: As goods and services
related to information and communication are among the most dynamic
sectors of our economies, 38 restricting trade in this area particularly affects
growth opportunities. Barriers to selected international communications,
such as data on market opportunities, on the creditworthiness of individuals or commercial enterprises, on debts and assets, or on sales and expenditures, could disrupt future trade and investment. Most countries are
currently experiencing sluggish growth, and limitations on new telematics
trade and investment opportunities could sidetrack efforts to stimulate
domestic and international growth and recovery.
Protective actions taken by a few governments also might start a chain
reaction of restrictions, with governments competing with one another to
defend and promote their perceived interests. Such steps could create
serious political friction among countries and could further disrupt world
trade during a time of tension over issues such as European agricultural
export subsidies, Japanese industrial targeting practices, and widespread
subsidization of exports by developing countries.
Impact on PTT-Private Sector Competition

Communication services between the United States and foreign countries
are provided jointly by private firms on the United States side and national
monopolies on the foreign side. Until recently the Federal Communications Commission allowed only AT&T to provide international voice service, while several International Record Carriers (IRCs) competed to
provide international "enhanced" information services. 3 9 In 1982, FCC
deregulation permitted for the first time AT&T and the IRCs to compete
head-to-head by deregulating enhanced services and permitting AT&T to
compete to supply these services. 40
Historically, foreign PTTs have negotiated operating agreements with
several American IRCs to provide the same enhanced services along the
same route. To discourage the PTTs from playing one IRC off against
others ("whipsawing"), the FCC maintained a "uniform settlements" policy, 41 which required all American IRCs providing the same service to the
same foreign point to specify the financial arrangements that were agreed
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upon. To alter the financial arrangements with the PTT, all of these IRCs
had to make the same change simultaneously. American users are concerned, however, that as the FCC has given up some of its regulatory
powers, they may now be more vulnerable to PTT whipsawing on both
new and existing services. In the past, whipsawing of American firms by
foreign PTTs was more difficult to engineer because the IRCs were less
numerous, maintained a large technological edge, and were therefore in a
better bargaining position. The proliferation of new companies and services, however, has weakened their bargaining position.
In upholding the Computer II Inquiry in August 1982, the FCC chose
to continue to regulate basic communications services, but to relinquish its
authority to regulate enhanced communications services. The Computer II
decision would permit any person or firm to enter into an operating agreement with a foreign PTT to provide a specific enhanced service without
seeking permission from the FCC. Although the FCC maintains that its
continued authority over the basic services will allow it to respond to
unfair competitive practices by foreign PTTs regarding enhanced services,
the users remain nervous. 42 The United States continues to seek ways to
ensure that American private companies will be able to compete fairly
abroad for new markets. 43

STRATEGIES FOR PRESERVING TRADE
What can we do about the growth of barriers to international trade in
communication, information and data processing services? As we have
pointed out, most barriers are intertwined with legitimate regulatory activities of governments, and in order to eliminate these barriers you have
to find a way of separating them from those legitimate regulatory activities. Moreover, in order to develop the international consensus necessary
to tackle these issues, one has to make it clear that one is not questioning
the legitimacy of the regulatory activity per se, but the avoidable protectionist elements of such regulation.
A second point to bear in mind is that the level of restrictions on
transborder data flows that has emerged is still relatively modest as compared to the potential restrictiveness of many proposed regulatory actions.
At the same time, current regulations covering communications activities
in many countries have retarded, but generally not prevented, the introduction of new value-added communication services. It is probably more
important at a governmental level, at least initially, to try to slow down
the introduction of new barriers than to embark on comprehensive
negotiations to remove existing barriers. In most cases, individual firms
have proven themselves capable of working out acceptable accommoda-
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tions with the host governments involved, with occasional support from
their home government on a case by case basis.
Negotiations aimed at the objective of slowing down or preventing the
introduction of new barriers to trade in information and communication
services must take account of the rapid pace of change in the technology,
and the considerable uncertainty faced by government officials concerning
future social issues that might emerge from the introduction of this new
technology. There is a very real danger, that, in the face of rapid change
and uncertainty, any comprehensive agreements that might be negotiated
prematurely could end up creating more restrictions than would exist in
the absence of any agreements. The challenge is to devise a set of negotiating objectives that will reduce the creation of new barriers, and reduce the
uncertainty now faced by the business community with respect to future
government actions, while not forcing governments to hedge the uncertainty they face through restrictive provisions.
The negotiating strategy the United States government has adopted in
the trade area is to aim initially for agreements on general principles and
procedures to sort out individual cases and to seek to develop, over time,
more comprehensive agreements. An agreement on general principles
would establish a clear direction for government policy, and provide a
basis for sorting out bilateral issues over regulations that have restrictive
effects on trade. It would remove business uncertainty, while not forcing
governments to commit themselves in detail on specific future situations
that are difficult to forsee.
Proposed Data Declaration
The United States has proposed that the industrial countries belonging to
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
agree to minimize the disruption of international information flows, while
recognizing the legitimacy of regulations aimed at social, cultural, and
security objectives. More specifically, the United States has called for a
"Data Declaration" that would be patterned after the 1974 OECD Trade
Pledge. 44
The draft data declaration proposed by the United States reads as follows:
Recognizing that information, computer and communications policies are
fundamental to economic progress and well-being;
Having completed guidelines for the protection of personal data and having
initiated an examination of the economic and legal aspects of non-personal
information flows;
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Considering that rapid technological advances in this area are transforming
the nature of the world economy, leading to uncertainty as to how governments might pattern future laws and regulations to keep pace with progress;
Understanding that governments have a special responsibility for taking
measures to provide the public with reliable communications services and in
this respect different countries may have different approaches in discharging
this responsibility;
Recognizing that in pursuing legitimate social goals, governments should
avoid developing laws, policies and practices which would create unnecessary obstacles to international trade and information flows;
Recalling the principles and objectives contained in the OECD Convention
and referred to in the Declaration on Trade policy;
AGREE: That the above mentioned state of affairs calls for wide cooperation
in the area of telecommunications, data processing, and information policy;
That current and possible future problems in this area can be significantly
reduced through close consultation among governments regarding issues
raised and the measures that could be adopted to resolve differences;
That the desire to meet the communication and data needs of Member
Countries can best be achieved through an environment which encourages
and rewards innovation.
In addition, these governments would declare their determination: A)
To maintain and improve an open system of international information
flows; B) To avoid restrictive measures which would disrupt the international flow of data; impede international trade in telecommunications, data
processing and information services; and inhibit economic growth, productivity, and technological innovation; C) To continue efforts to consult
with each other on issues covered by this Declaration in order to further
the achievement of its objectives.
Multilateral Negotiations on Trade in Services
Over the long term, the United States has proposed the preparation of
future multilateral negotiations on trade in services. This proposal was put
forward by the United States at a meeting last November of Trade Ministers representing the eighty-eight contracting parties of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). After considerable debate, the
Ministers agreed to initiate national studies of the issues involved, with the
objective of reaching a decision in 1984 on future negotiations on trade in
services. 45 While the United States government has not decided what its
objectives might be with respect to negotiations covering trade in communication and information services, the possibilities include a regulatory
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code based on the GATT standards code negotiated during the Tokyo
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, an agreement covering the
"Right to Plug Into" global communication systems, an agreement on fair
terms of competition between government communication monopolies
and private firms in the area of value-added communication services and
data/information services, and procedures for the negotiated reduction of
specific barriers.
The Standards Code 46 negotiating during the Tokyo round of GATT
may provide a model for an international agreement designed to assure
that domestic regulations are transparent and administered fairly. The
Standards Code provides some basic principles and a set of domestic and
international procedures to implement them. In brief, it establishes an
obligation to minimize the restrictive effects on trade of domestic standards by seeking the least distortive design and implementation procedures. It also provides for transparency and due process in the
administration of standards and establishes an international dispute settlements mechanism. In keeping with these obligations, several signatories to
the code have indicated an interest in multilateral negotiations on the issue
of access to the interconnect market. 47
The "right to plug" equipment into the public telecommunications network could be covered by another type of agreement. 48 To protect the
reliability and integrity of the communication system, it is necessary to
establish technical standards for equipment designed to be plugged into
the public telephone system. Governments may elect to negotiate an international agreement which establishes a "right to plug in" for equipment
that meets agreed technical standards and allows firms to sell services that
can be provided by using such equipment. Such an agreement might be
complementary to work done in the Consultative Committee on International Telephone and Telegraph (CCITT) and the International Standards
Organization (ISO) or might even take place under the auspices of these
organizations.
Competition between government-owned communication monopolies
and privately-owned firms in the area of value-added communication
services and information services could be covered by another agreement.
The key principle underlying such competition could be that governmentowned or controlled communication monopolies should deal with foreign,
private firms on an arms-length, competitive basis.
Foreign suppliers of domestic or imported telematic services should be
treated on the same basis as domestic firms. In general, the interactions
between private firms and national telecommunication monopolies raise
four main issues. 49 First, policymakers need to consider on what basis
domestic PTTs should sell or provide services to others, including foreign
buyers. PTTs might agree to sell or provide their services to foreign and
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domestic-owned purchasers or users on an equivalent basis. Discriminatory practices would arise only if government sellers and providers failed to
treat all purchasers or users identically.
Second, PTTs might agree that when they purchased services they
would allow foreign providers or importers to compete on an equal footing
with domestic suppliers of the service for that particular sale. While continuing to preserve some portion of the business to satisfy domestic security concerns, PTTs might nonetheless encourage competition for contracts
from foreign-owned suppliers of information and communication services.
This idea is roughly analagous to the principles embodied in the Government Procurement Code 5 0 negotiated during the Tokyo round trade
negotiations, which could also be applied to telematic services in addition
to goods.
Third, to the extent that PTTs compete directly with domestic and
foreign suppliers of services, they might agree to do so on an arms-length,
commercial basis. PTTs could conceivably agree to conduct their business
to the extent possible in a manner compatible with Article XVII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 51 In practice, this would
mean that PTTs would agree to forego their monopoly bargaining position
in most cases in order to allow competition to produce efficient, effective
service for users and consumers.
Fourth, in pricing public telecommunication services, PTT's might agree
not to discriminate among users, except when justified by differences in
the costs of providing such services. PTT's would also agree to set rates on
international communication services that reflected the costs of providing
such services. In other words, PTT's would agree not to use exorbitantly
high rates as a means of discouraging the international flow of data.
Barriers to trade in communication and information services might also
be liberalized by inclusion in a broader negotiating framework for trade in
services. Such an overall approach has been outlined in articles by Ambassador William E. Brock, the current United States Trade Representative. 52
Under these proposals, governments would agree (1) to notify all regulatory measures which were designed to protect domestic industries; i.e., all
barriers would be made transparent; 53 (2) to accept the application of the
national treatment principle to all regulations not notified as barriers; i.e.,
all domestic and foreign companies covered by the regulations would
receive equally favorable treatment; and (3) all regulations notified as
barriers would be subject to negotiated reductions or removal.
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Our hope is that sometime in the present decade the United States and
other trading countries will have proceeded far enough in creating a trade
regime covering services to permit them to reduce multilaterally existing
barriers to trade in services, including telematics services. The United
States will, of course, continue to work on a case-by-case and bilateral
basis to remove the most serious obstacles to trade in services but, ultimately, if the trading system is to grow dynamically, countries will have
to address barriers to trade on a multilateral basis for the full range of
services. A considerable amount of work still lies ahead before we can
develop concrete proposals on how to approach future negotiations or
before we know precisely what part telematics services will play in those
negotiations. The most desirable structure for negotiations will emerge
only once we have made progress in building a conceptual base for trade
in services. Progress toward ensuring continued free trade in telematics
services is particularly important because the coming years will be the most
important for the evolution of the world trading system since the creation
of the GATT'. Countries need to improve international cooperation on
trade in goods, but they also need to focus on trade in services before it
becomes the crisis of tomorrow. Telematics services may well be the foundation for the long-term stability of the trading system. Industrial nations
already entering the information era have a special stake in making sure
that trade in telematics services expands and continues to contribute to
world economic vitality. Improved international economic cooperation depends on the international financial, transportation, and above all communication systems. It is imperative that these systems remain integrated.
So long as national leaders commit themselves to support the international
trading system, including the new trade in telematic and other services, the
prospects for growth, prosperity, and cooperation will be stronger than
ever.
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Resources Policy of the Center for Information Policy Research at Harvard University. "Teleinformatics" is the term adopted by the authors in 14 CORELL INT'L L.J. (1981), a volume
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created by these changes, see TOBIN FOUNDATION, STRUCTURAL ISSUES INGLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS
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oF COMMERCE, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. REPORT ON LONG RANGE GOALS IN INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND

INFORMATION

(Comm. Print 1983). [hereinafter cited as

LONG

RANGE GOALS, COMMERCE DEP'T REP.].
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tions that restrict the manner in which private line circuits may be used. Chief among these
is a general requirement that such circuits not be used by a customer to offer any type of
international telecommunications services, enhanced or otherwise, unless the customer is
officially classified as an RPOA. [Recognized Private Operating Agency]").
14 NORDTEL, an association of the Telecommunications Administrations of Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden sent identical letters to seven U.S. International
Record Carriers (IRCs) at the end of June 1982. The letter proposed procedures for establishing operating agreements between the Nordic Administration and the U.S. IRCs for joint
provision of new communication services. NORDTEL proposed that it would "enter into an
operating agreement with one, or a limited number of carriers," to be selected on the basis
of competitive bids.
Between late August and early September 1982, the Belgium, Luxembourg, and Netherlands Telecommunications Administration sent the same seven U.S. IRCs similar letters
proposing negotiations for new services that raised the specter of competitive bidding and
exclusivity.
The Nordic and Benelux proposals explicitly linked their letters to concern over U.S.
deregulation of enhanced international communications service. The U.S. carriers were concerned that these initiatives could leave them open to whipsawing by foreign PTT monopolies and would lead to anticompetitive actions in these countries and elsewhere. The U.S.
Government was concerned that these initiatives might affect the competitiveness and profitability of the U.S. telecommunications industry; the price and availability of international
communications services available to U.S. government agencies and private consumers; and
that this could create a bad precedent for the handling of our international trade in services.
After some months of positioning on both sides, the Nordic and Benelux Administrations
assured the U.S. that they would not seek exclusive arrangements or abandon the uniform
settlements policy and whipsaw U.S. carriers. They did not in any way, however, acknowledge that their letters were inappropriate or beyond their rightful scope of activities. See Foreign
Bid for Exclusive InternationalData Arrangements Draws U.S. Ire, COMM. DAILY, Sept. 30, 1982, at 4-5.
15 Two cases are particularly relevant. First, in 1977 General Electric Company entered
into negotiations with Cable and Wireless (a British concern which operates Hong Kong's
telecommunications) to secure private line service for its data processing network between
the United States and Hong Kong. They made no progress. At the same time Cable and
Wireless was seeking to negotiate agreements with three U.S. IRCs to provide usage-sensitive
public data service between the U.S. and Hong Kong. These negotiations succeeded. However, when the three IRCs petitioned the FCC for authority to initiate services, GE through
ADAPSO petitioned the FCC to deny the application unless it received access to their private
lines services to Hong Kong. Cable and Wireless suddenly did grant these services. The
problem was resolved. But uses of the data lines point out that under new deregulation the
FCC would not have needed to approve the IRCs petition and there would have been no
leverage to persuade Cable and Wireless to allow GE into Hong Kong. See Markoski, supra note
10, at 305-11.
The second case involves an application by PACNET, a foreign owned carrier ultimately
owned by Cable and Wireless, for a DNIC (Data Network Identification Code) which would
allow foreign telecommunications users to select PACNET as the network the dialer wished
to access. If PACNET were granted a DNIC, it might be possible in the wake of the Computer
II decision, see infra note 28, for PACNET to provide in the U.S. virtually any internationally
switched service without requiring FCC authorization. This might eventually allow PACNET
to link with its foreign parent to dominate some international communication services because it would control both ends of the line. PACNET under such an arrangement would have
significant advantage over U.S. entities providing the same international communication
services. For a complete review, see The request of PACNET Communications Corporation
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that it may be assigned a Data Network Identification Code, Comm'n mem. (F.C.C. Aug. 25,
1982).
16 SeeHOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMM., INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION FLOW, H.R. Doc
No. 1535, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 14-15 (1980).
17 In addition, countries may limit the number of data bases to which a company may
interconnect. This was the problem faced by Control Data and Tymshare in Japan. These two
companies sought leased channel services from KDD between the U.S. and Japan. After a
delay of over a year KDD granted the requests but insisted that interconnection could only
be made at one specific U.S. computer center. KDD also demanded that the circuit not be
connected to any U.S. public network. These restrictions prevented the marketing of the full
line of services of Control Data and Tymshare. After bilateral discussion involving the Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative and Japanese officials, Japan relaxed its regulations, permitting U.S. data base vendors to offer switched access to several different data bases. Nevertheless, some problems remain. See Markoski, supra note 10, at 311-17.
18 Efforts are underway in a number of international and regional organizations, such as
the Conference of European Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT), the
International Standards Organization (ISO) and the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU). See LONG RANGE GOALS, COMMERCE DEPT. REP., supra note 10, at App. B.
19 For example, new West German regulations prohibit users connected with the West
German public network from transmitting all raw data over private leased lines to foreign
private data networks for processing. Some processing must be performed in West Germany.
20 Not surprisingly, we remain skeptical of complaints that free flow arguments are the
refuge of the rich and powerful. In following infant industry protectionist strategies LDCs
cut themselves off from new developments and make it more difficult to integrate their
systems into the world system later. If LDCs adopt incompatible standards they may condemn themselves to permanent backwardness in telematics. For some of the reverse arguments, however, see United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations. Transnational
Corporations and Transborder Data Flows: A Technical Paper, at 22-41, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/
1982/12 (1982). For the U.S. view, see generally InternationalData Flow: Hearings Before a Subcomm.
of the House Committee on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 488 (1980).
21 The Swedes were the first to raise this issue in the early 1970s. See GANLEY & GANLEY,
To INFORM ORCONTROL? THE NEW COMMUNICATION NETWORKS (1982).
22
Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg and Norway have adopted, and others have proposed,
provisions designed to protect the privacy of legal entities such as corporations or associations. Moreover, the Council of Europe Treaty on Privacy may be applicable to legal persons
if countries specifically choose to include them.
23 In addition, privacy received considerable attention in the U.S. See W. Ware, Aspects
of Privacy and Access (March 21-22, 1983) (unpublished paper presented to the workshop
on policy issues for computers, communications and information sponsored by the National
Science Foundation, Dedham, Massachusetts).
24 For a review of privacy guidelines in industrial countries, see New OECD Guidelines on
Privacy, 1980 OECD OBSERVER 36; see also Eger, The Global Phenomenon of Teleinformatics: An Introduction, 14 CoREu. INT'L L.J. 203, 210-17 (1981); When privacy laws hurt trade, Bus. WEEK, April 14,
1980, at 104D-04H.
25 See Bortnick, supra note 2, at 345-48; TRANSHORDER DATA FLOWS AND BRAZIL, supra note 2.
But see also The jockeying to build the/irstLatin Satellite, Bus. WEEK, August 24,1981, at 45. The reverse
problem is bothering developed countries. Satellite broadcast of television signals cannot
easily be kept out of a neighboring country's market. Programming and commercials are
received whether one wants them or not. See European States Face Problem of Controlling Their
Neighbors' TV, Wall Street Journal, March 22, 1982, at 1.
26 The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has assembled a list of barriers to trade

IMPACT OF REGULATION ON INT'L COMMUNICATIONS

165

in services which runs to over 250 pages. This is available by country or by service. See

U.S.T.R.,

TRADE BARRIERS TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS DATA AND INFORMATION SERVICES

(1982). Ex-

amples of barriers are cited here and briefly described in this compendium. See also Canadian
Banking Act, 29 Eliz II., Part XII (19 November, 1980); Feketekuty, International Trade in Banking
Services: The Negotiating Agenda, THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MONEY AND BANKING IN THE
1980s, 264-315 (G. Hyde ed. 1981); Bushkin, Transborder Data Flow: Evolution of the Issue
and Impact on Banking (March 28, 1983) (unpublished paper prepared for American Bankers
Association, available from Telemation Ass'n, Inc., Washington, D.C.).
27 See Eger, supra note 24, at 226-27.
28 See Second Computer Inquiry-Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), aff'd sub nom.
Computer and Communications Industrial Ass'n v. F.C.C., 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Messages from foreign telecommunications administrations concerned about unilateral actions by the United States under Computer 17 were submitted as an attachment to a petition
for reconsideration filed by Western Union International before the Federal Communications
Commission. See GTE Telenet Communications Corp., FCC No. I-T-C-81-274 (Sept. 24,
1982). The responding administrations were those of Austria, Belgium, Fiji, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, South Korea, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom. For an assessment of the potential benefits and problems of
deregulation in the telecommunications sector, see Muller, Potentialfor competition and the role of
PTTs, 1981 TELECOM. POL'Y 18-23.
29 See LONG RANGE GOALS, COMMERCE DEP'T REP., supra note 10, at 136-37. NTIA commissioned a study on telecommunications deregulation that focused on Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan,
Mexico, Philippines, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Venezuala.
30 In order to develop its own computer industry, Brazil restricts computer imports and
limits the number of foreign manufacturers that may build computers of various sizes in
Brazil. Japan has also been slow to purchase foreign components, preferring to rely on
sometimes more expensive domestic suppliers. See High-Technology Gateway: Foreignersdemand a
piece of NTT's $3 billion market, Bus. WEEK, August 9, 1982, at 38-44.
31 Seven rounds of multilateral trade rounds between 1947 and 1979 reduced average
tariff levels from over 50 percent to less than 5 percent.
32 When tariffs were removed existing government measures that acted as nontariff
barriers to trade became more obvious. In addition, when governments have chosen to
hamper trade flows during the 1970s and 1980s they have generally erected nontariff rather
than tariff measures to do so.
33
See Brock, Trade in Services and Economic Cooperation, to be published in a volume in honor
of Wilhelm Haferkamp (available from U.S.T.R.) [hereinafter referred to as Brock, Trade in
Services ].
34 Trade in services, and particularly trade in communication services, is one of those rare
areas where governments are moving to create rules that clearly will be needed even though
trade distortions to date have not crippled world trade. For a U.S. view of what is needed,
see id. See also Brock, A Simple Plan for Negotiating on Trade in Services, 5 T E WORLD ECONoMAY 229
(1982).
35 An earlier threat to SWIFT was resolved by having the bank agree to higher charges.
See Markoski, supra note 10, at 298-99.
36 One bank is said to fly computer tapes via the Concorde to New York for processing
rather than send the data by satellite or cable. There are numerous cases of multiple processing centers for the same data.
37 Cowhey, Aronson, Ramsey, and Markoski, supra note 12, suggests that new patterns
of joint ventures and alliances are developing in part as a result of this.
38 Some segments of the telematics market are expanding at rates of over 15 percent per
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annum. Experts estimate that the global communications market, excluding much of the
equipment business, will be somewhere between $150 and $500 billion by 1990, depending
on what is included.
39 SeeOverseas Communications Services, F.C.C. 82-547 Mimeo No. 32476 at 153 (Dec.
22, 1982). The U.S. makes a distinction between "basic" and "enhanced" communications
services. Basic services involve the unmanipulated transmission of voice and data. These
remain regulated. Enhanced services involve some manipulation of what is transmitted. This
is now deregulated. Foreign PTTs object strenously to this division, contending that the line
between basic and enhanced services is fuzzy at best and nonexistent at worst. Seesupra note
28 and accompanying text.
40 For an overview of changes in U.S. international telecommunications policy, see Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, The
Foundations of United States Information Policy (June, 1980) (unpublished agency report);
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPE-

TITION AND DEREGULATION Act OF 1981, REPORT ON S.898, 97TH CONG., 1ST SEss. (Comm. Print
1981); LONG RANGE GOALS, COMMERCE DEP'T REP., supra note 10.
41 Uniform settlements assured that all private foreign firms linked with a PTT received
identical financial deals. This was needed because the international lines are almost always
owned 50-50 by the two countries' operators. However, when a number of private firms each
provide services to the same PTT the opportunity for the PTT to use its monopoly power
as leverage to forge a better deal exists. The PTT could, for example, direct a disproportionate
amount of outbound communications to the foreign IRC that took the smallest cut. However,
so long as the FCC enforces a uniform settlement deal this type of action would be averted.
42
Seesupra notes 28, 39 and 40 and accompanying text. The FCC claims that its continued
control over basic services will be sufficient to prevent this kind of activity. Some IRCs
disagree, and are worried that PTTs will keep activities simple by treating AT&T either
consciously or unconsciously as America's PIT, to the IRCs disadvantage.
43 The U.S. Trade Representative's Office is assessing the impact of U.S. deregulation on
American competitive positions in the telecommunications and other service sectors. The
USTR is examining whether (1) U.S. deregulation allows foreign concerns greater access to
the American market, without gaining comparable concessions for U.S. firms in foreign
markets; (2) U.S. deregulation allows foreign governments or monopolies to play American
companies off against one another because the U.S. Government has unilaterally relinquished
its statutory ability to intervene to protect the rights of American business; and (3) American
companies' competitive position deteriorates because foreign governments promote and/or
subsidize their companies in ways that the United States is unwilling to match.
44 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Council Communique,
OECD Doc. C (74) 83 (Final) 5-6 (1974). The Trade Pledge was approved by the Council at
its 359th meeting in Paris on May 30, 1974.
45 The GATT Ministerial Statement issued at the close of the meeting of Trade Ministers
in Geneva in late November 1982 stated that:
The CONTRACTING PARTIES decide:
1. To recommend to each contracting party with an interest in services of different
types to undertake, as far as it is able, national examination of the issues in this sector.
2. To invite contracting parties to exchange information on such matters among themselves, inter alia through international organizations such as GATT. The compilation
and distribution of such information should be based on as uniform a format as
possible.
3. To review the results of these examinations, along with the information and comments provided by relevant international organizations, at their 1984 Session and to
consider whether any multilateral action in these matters is appropriate and desirable.
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Available from the Press Office, U.S. Trade Representative. See also Sapir, Trading Services:
Policy Issues for the Eighties, 1982 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 77 (1982). Some of the difficulties inherent
in possible negotiations are suggested by Bushkin, Trade Remedies EndangerFree Flow of Information,
L.A. Times May 3, 1982, Part II, at 9.
46 The Standards Code was negotiated as part of the MTN negotiation. Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade, April 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 405, T.I.A.S. No. 9616,-U.N.T.S.-.
47 The United Kingdom in particular has been moving toward liberalization and privatization of their telecommunications system. The Thatcher government has granted a license to
a consortium for the launching of Project Mercury, a private concern that will be allowed to
compete with British Telecom. See Morgan, supra note 7, at 1.
48 The United States and the United Kingdom are conducting talks on telecommunications interconnect equipment with the aim of reaching a bilateral understanding that will
ensure nondiscriminatory access to products from either country to each country's interconnect markets. The understanding is likely to include provisions relating to approval processes.
49 Issues surrounding the desirability of a services monopoly code were raised in a U.S.
paper submitted to the OECD Trade Committee. See United States Delegation to OECD Trade
Committee, Developing a Conceptual Framework for Trade in Services (October 4, 1982)
(unpublished paper available at Office of U.S. Trade Representative).
50 The Procurement Code was negotiated during the MTN negotiation during the 1979
Agreement on Government Procurement, April 12, 1979,-U.S.T.-, T.I.A.S. No. 10403,U.N.T.S.-. The code applies to services insofar as such services relate directly to trade in
goods, and account for less than 50 percent of the purchase price. It is worth examining
whether the Procurement Code could be extended to services traded in their own right.
However, European nations specifically excluded their telecommunications monopolies from
the applicability of the Procurement Code when it was originally negotiated.
51 Non-discriminatory Treatment on the Part of State-Trading Enterprises, General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, art. VII, 61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 4 Bevans 639,
55-61 U.N.T.S. 194.
52 Brock, supra notes 32 and 33.
53 Transparency refers to the ability to receive full information concerning trade restrictions, regulation or actions that governments take in the trade field. In the United States, for
example, all such measures are publicly notified in the Federal Register. If countries do not
publish or make readily available such information, this would constitute a nontariff barrier
to trade.

